The aim is to explore the protection that international human rights law offers to refugees, asylum-seekers, and the forcibly displaced. The ambition of the global rights framework is to guarantee a defined range of rights to all human beings, and thus move the basis for normative entitlement from exclusive reliance on national membership to a common humanity. This comprehensive and international perspective remains formally tied to states -acting individually or collectively -in terms of creation and implementation. The norms must find an entry point into the empirical world, and there must be clarity on responsibilities for practical delivery. It should remain unsurprising that the expectations raised by the normative reach of the law are frequently dashed in the complex and difficult human world of instrumental politics, power, and conflict. The intention here is to outline the international human rights law context, and indicate the value and limitations for the protection of refugees and asylum-seekers. A question is then raised about possible reform.
Introduction
International refugee law is a regime of protection connected to a legally constructed status with specified guarantees. 1 There is a dedicated supervisory mechanism in place, in the form of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 2 Refugees do not only benefit from the rights contained in the 1951 Convention, 3 and like all those forcibly displaced, exist within a global framework of human rights standards and institutions. Refugee law's anchorage in a particular (and evolving) understanding of a created category co-exists with an international legal order that tends to emphasise "all human beings", "every human they impact on the approach to be taken to current arrangements and future reform. If refugee law is tired, anachronistic and a distraction then it may mean that strategic energy is directed elsewhere (the further development of international human rights law to protect all those forcibly displaced and address root casuses). However, if it regarded as of fundamental and ongoing relevance then tactical thought might be invested in its reconstruction and promotion (reform that integrates human rights advances more fully into existing international refugee law).
However it may be classified in international law, for those who seek to defend the continuing integrity and primacy of refugee law there remains a worry that the potential strength and specificity of refugee protection might be undermined in well-intentioned efforts to promote human rights. 9 In this understanding, human rights law is vital but has instrumental value in keeping the refugee definition relevant and objectively delimited, 10 developing the interpretation of specific guarantees of refugee law, and securing additional protections to refugees in general, and to specific groups of refugees.
11
As Vincent Chetail notes, if the starting point is the primacy of refugee law then human rights law will be essentially supplementary, with the temptation among refugee lawyers to stress its limitations and supporting role. 12 Chetail challenges this thinking, and argues that the "fetishism of the Geneva Convention is no longer tenable". 13 He reverses the normative order by stressing that refugee law 14 is a limited legal regime 15 and supports international human rights law as the main basis now for refugee protection. He suggests that:
9 See James C. Hathaway, "Leveraging Asylum" (2010) 45 Texas International Law Journal 503-536, at 504: "The problem is that none of these new sources of international protection expressly defines how members of the broader class of non-returnable persons are to be treated. In contrast to the Refugee Convention […], the new protections against refoulement are bare-bones entitlements (footnotes omitted)." Hathaway is equally concerned about "the persistent overstatement of the reach of international refugee law" (535). See also, James C. Hathaway and Jason Pobjoy, "Queer Cases Make Bad Law" (2012) 13 Ibid. 72. 14 " [T] he Geneva Convention is not a human rights treaty in the orthodox sense, for both historical and legal reasons." Ibid. 22. 15 "[C]ompared to human rights law, the Geneva Convention has much more to receive than to give." Ibid. 70. its orbit and anchored it as a satellite within the constellation of other applicable human rights treaties. 16 Chetail also draws out the political and legal implications, for example, the need to face openly the human rights violations that give rise to displacement, thus retaining a holistic perspective on refugee protection in its human rights context. 17 One of the implications is that the general guarantees of human rights law may offer more protection than the specialist regime.
18
Human rights law and refugee law are limited mechanisms for the protection of refugees, asylum-seekers and the forcibly displaced. Refugees benefit from both regimes, and it is evident that where applicable human rights guarantees go further than refugee law they can and should be used. The growth of complementary forms of protection -as a way of reflecting international human rights obligations -is notable. 19 There is an understandable tendency among advocates of refugee law to highlight its strengths, and thus a need to be reminded of its limits and how far human rights law has travelled. Refugee law speaks to a world where international norms are realised through a carefully constructed status that many states are content to endorse and use. Human rights law is working towards a paradigm where guarantees apply to everyone, and people are then shielded from violations of accepted international norms. Whatever view is taken, it is now well-established that international human rights law is key; in the encouragement of complementary forms of protection, 20 and in recognising a more expansive range of reasons for flight. 21 The longer term question for advocates of refugee law is whether interpretative internal renewal is sufficient or defensible.
If not, then it is time for a determined reform project that would seek over time to achieve international legal change (through a new protocol to the Refugee Convention or in other ways 
International human rights law: relevant standards
International human rights law provides a wide-ranging source of norms, and is underpinned by an institutional architecture. As Sarah Joseph and Joanna Kyriakakis argue:
While international human rights law has developed to the point where States can no longer legitimately claim that human rights are a domestic matter, there are significant limits to the international community's ability to respond to recalcitrant States that persist in human rights abuses. Enforcement machinery has not kept pace with standardsetting.
22
There are evident gaps, weaknesses and limits but it retains normative value. Given the reach of international human rights law, and its relevance for all those displaced and in need of protection, it could be said that the whole body of law is potentially applicable and relevant.
23
The effective implementation and enforcement of international standards is also a core element of prevention, and ultimately in tackling the root causes of refugee movements. Would displacement be the global concern it is if human rights standards were adequately reflected in lived experience? The legal and political rationale of the entire system is precisely to eliminate the causes of forced displacement, as well as ensuring all persons (wherever located) are treated with dignity and respect. mechanisms. In addition, although the relevance of customary international norms should not be neglected, it is not also easy to achieve agreement on their scope (or existence) in this area.
25
The formal picture will not capture everything, as practical deployment of human rights can lead to levels of relevance and impact that are not explicable by the "pedigree" of the norm.
At national level, it is sometimes possible to use international standards and guidance in useful ways that transcend reliance on notions of monism/dualism or obligations under international treaties. This is not to undermine the ultimate utility of being able to speak of binding and authoritative obligations, and legal responsibility. It is to make the simple point that in this interconnected age individuals and communities will use all the available tools to advance their arguments. On occasions this approach works. 
31
The human rights advances that continue to be made are in the development of the prohibition on return, and as a result, the emergence of complementary forms of protection.
32
The non-refoulement obligation is not confined to the provisions of the Refugee Convention or to refugee law and practice. 33 Human rights law increasingly drives the evolution of the norm. 
38
As noted, other elements of the international human rights system recognize the prohibition, 39 and it is also adopted at the regional level. 40 Other rights protected in international law will apply to refugees, for example, the use of detention around the world has attracted concern.
One the of limitations remains, however, that the international mechanisms are not always clear about what then positively happens to those who cannot be returned for human rights reasons.
41
This is addressed to some extent by the creation of complementary protection systems, and it is possible to draw together (from the body of existing international human rights law) the basic obligations that should apply. Nevertheless, despite its flaws it is refugee law's ability to address this question with more precision that remains its most valuable characteristic. It is equally the case that international human rights law is not silent on this matter.
Using International Human Rights Protection
The aim now is to consider contexts where the normative framework is used. One way of doing this is to reflect on the work of the UN Human Rights Committee in relevant individual communications. 42 As indicated, the ICCPR 1966 reflects the language of "humanity" with its references to "all individuals", "every human being", "everyone" and "all persons", and the Human Rights Committee has confirmed this inclusive approach. 43 How has the Committee dealt with communications in this area? Arguably, it is the work on non-refoulement that has thus far proved the most instructive. The
UN Human Rights Committee
Committee contributes to the evolution of the principle through its interpretation of relevant provisions of the ICCPR:
Moreover, the article 2 obligation requiring that States Parties respect and ensure the Covenant rights for all persons in their territory and all persons under their control entails an obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory, where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm such as that contemplated in articles 6 and 7 either in the country to which removal is to be effected or in any country to which the person may subsequently be removed.
44
In applying Articles 6 and 7 the Committee stresses the personal nature of the risk, and that there is a "high threshold" to be attained before substantial grounds will be established of a real risk of irreparable harm.
45
The ICCPR 1966 is not only relevant to return but also applies to, for example, detention. 46 Where there is a finding of a violation, the Committee notes that the individual has a right to "an effective and enforceable remedy". 47 The Committee is also, through its
Concluding Observations, able to offer specific recommendations on how refugee and asylum processes might be improved.
48
Given the use of the ICCPR in extradition, deportation or expulsion it is worth exploring how the Committee has approached this task in selected communications. The Committee concluded:
[T]hat the State party did not adequately address the concern that the author's personal circumstances … might lead to him being designated as a failed asylum seeker and as an individual who has not completed the compulsory military service requirement in Eritrea or as a conscientious objector.
52

M.I. v Sweden involved the question of sexual orientation, forced marriage, and
deportation to Bangladesh. 53 The author was living in Sweden, and was forced to return to Bangladesh (when her husband learned of her sexual orientation), where she alleged she was detained, beaten and raped (and that her partner was kidnapped). She subsequently returned to Sweden where she claimed asylum (on the basis of the treatment of lesbians in Bangladesh by state and non-state actors). Her asylum claim in Sweden was rejected, and the issue for the Committee was whether there would be a violation of Article 7 if she was deported. The
Committee noted that the author's allegation that she was raped by the Bangladeshi police while in detention was not challenged, her sexual orientation was not contested (and it was in the public domain), her mental health was affected, 54 and stressed that the inconsistencies and any ambiguity in her evidence did not undermine the reality of the risk. 55 The Committee also observed that the existence of a law criminalising homosexual acts in Bangladesh stigmatised the LGBT community and "constitutes an obstacle to the investigation and sanction of persecution against these persons". Against the background of the situation faced by persons belonging to sexual minorities, as reflected in reports provided by the parties, the Committee is of the view that, in the particular case of the author, the State party failed to take into due consideration the author's allegations regarding the events she experienced in Bangladesh because of her sexual orientation -in particular her mistreatment by the police -in assessing the alleged risk she would face if returned to her country of origin.
57
In S.Y.L. v Australia the questions included return where it was claimed there would be no access to appropriate medical care. 58 The author and his family faced deportation to TimorLeste (following unsuccessful claims for refugee and humanitarian protection in Australia) and argued that this would "deny them their right to health, which they could not receive anywhere else". 59 While there was acknowledgement that the author and his wife did "suffer from several chronic illnesses", 60 the Committee raised concerns about the level of detail in the medical reports provided by the author, noted that reasons had not been provided why he could not live elsewhere in the country (where medical treatment was available), and there was no "information indicating an acute condition that would make the author's return to Timor Leste an immediate threat to his health". 61 The Committee concluded that the claim was inadmissible.
The questions raised by the Australian approach to detention were addressed in While there was acceptance of their protection needs (the authors were recognized as refugees either by the Australian authorities or UNHCR 65 ) the adults were refused visas due to adverse security assessments and thus detained pending removal. 66 The authors challenged their detained "for a brief initial period" but that any additional detention is arbitrary "absent particular reasons specific to the individual". 69 There should be a case-by-case assessment and "less invasive measures" must be taken into account. 70 The decision must "take into account the needs of children and the mental health conditions of those detained". of blasphemy. 76 He claimed that his rights -and the rights of his wife and 3 of his childrenwould be violated. His refugee application in Canada was rejected on credibility grounds. In finding a violation of Articles 6(1) and 7 (in the event of the deportation being carried out) the Committee indicated that religious minorities faced "fierce persecution and insecurity" and lacked effective state protection, 77 the government had dropped a proposed amendment to the blasphemy code, and there was an "upsurge in blasphemy cases in 2012". 78 Although there was evidence that death sentences were not carried out, "several instances of extra-judicial assassination, by private actors, of members of religious minorities accused under the blasphemy law have been reported, without the Pakistani authorities being willing or able, to protect them".
79
In Al-Gertani v Bosnia and Herzegovina an Iraqi national in an immigration detention centre, who had deserted from the army (with consequences in particular for his brother), and whose asylum claim was dismissed based on security concerns and credibility (he had gained citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996 under a false name), argued that his return to
Iraq would breach several ICCPR rights. 80 His complaints in relation to Articles 9(1), (2), (4);
17; 23 and 24 were held to be admissible, the rest were not. The Committee concluded that the State party had breached Article 9(1) as it had "failed to justify the necessity of continued and prolonged detention … and to demonstrate that other, less intrusive measures could not have achieved the same end". 81 There were also violations of Articles 9(2) and (4), due to the lack of information provided to the author, and the nature and conduct of the review by the courts in the State party. 82 In finding that there would be a breach of Articles 17 and 24 (impact on family life) the Committee underlined the impact that the national security rationale had on the treatment of the author; he was not in a position to deal with the allegations that he posed a security threat.
In Hamida v Canada the author (a Tunisian national living in Canada) faced expulsion to Tunisia. 83 His refugee claim in Canada was rejected, one of the reasons being (credibility complaint included the argument that he would face detention, and a risk of torture or disappearance on return. 87 The Committee highlighted that:
[W]hen the author's claims were considered by the State party's authorities, much weight was given to the fact that the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees did not apply to him and it appears that inadequate consideration was given to the specific rights of the author under the Covenant and such other instruments as the Convention Against Torture.
88
The author's Article 6 complaint did not convince the Committee, and was found to involve "no more than general allegations mentioning the risk of detention inhuman conditions and the fact that he would be deprived of access to justice and might disappear". 89 The Committee was persuaded by the Article 7 complaint, and concluded that substantial evidence was provided that the author did have a real and personal risk. 90 As a consequence of his dissent he had been disciplined and detained (with pressure exerted on his family), his asylum application in Canada would, the Committee noted, also mark him out as an opponent of the regime.
91
The matter of diplomatic assurances in a security context was addressed in ill-treatment), and argued that in so doing Sweden violated several provisions of the ICCPR.
On the question of assurances the Committee stated:
In determining the risk of such treatment in the present case, the Committee must consider all relevant elements, including the general situation of human rights in the State. The existence of diplomatic assurances, their content and the existence and implementation of enforcement mechanisms are all factual elements relevant to the overall determination of whether, in fact, a real risk of proscribed ill-treatment exists.
93
As a result of findings by the Committee against Torture in Agiza v Sweden, 94 the State party "conceded that there was a risk of ill-treatment" and that it "relied on the diplomatic assurances alone for its belief". 95 In finding that the expulsion did amount to a violation of Article 7, the Committee noted the factors that would determine whether any assurances would be sufficiently robust. 96 There was "no mechanism for monitoring their enforcement" and no arrangements for "effective implementation", the visits that did take place only started after five weeks, and did not "conform to key aspects of international good practice". 97 The decision to expel in the author's case accordingly amounted to a breach of article 7, read in conjunction with article 2 of the Covenant. 100 The case of Ahani v Canada again raised the interaction between national security and refugee protection. 101 In this instance, an Iranian citizen was initially granted refugee status in Canada but then (following intelligence reports indicating he was working for the Iranian Ministry of
Intelligence and Security) held to be inadmissible, and he was detained until his eventual deportation (before the Committee's determination). In finding violations of Articles 9(4), 13
(read with Article 7), and concluding that the State party had breach its obligations under the Optional Protocol, the Committee highlighted several procedural problems with challenges available against the security certification system in Canada. 102 Although the Committee did not need to decide on the question of the risk of torture or ill-treatment and whether it had in fact taken place on return, it did note that "the prohibition on torture, including as expressed in article 7 of the Covenant, is an absolute one that is not subject to countervailing considerations". 103 The appropriate effective remedy outlined by the Committee included "to make reparation to the author if it comes to light that torture was in fact suffered subsequent to deportation" as well as "to avoid similar violations in the future" and this to include "appropriate steps to ensure that the Committee's requests for interim measures of protection will be respected". 
Other International Human Rights Mechanisms
The UN Human Rights Committee is not the only international mechanism of relevance to the protection of refugees and asylum-seekers. Other treaty-monitoring bodies have experience of dealing with related human rights concerns. For example, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has indicated that:
[A]rticle 2(d) of the Convention encompasses the obligation of States parties to protect women from being exposed to a real, personal and foreseeable risk of serious forms of gender-based violence, irrespective of whether such consequences would take place outside the territorial boundaries of the sending State party (footnote omitted).
105
In Rivera v Canada the question of asylum from domestic violence was raised before the Committee. 106 The author here argued that her deportation to Mexico (and that of her two The Committee highlights why these recommendation can be of some practical value by making precise and detailed suggestions that give meaning to the relevant standards. conduct an effective investigation into a racist attack. 112 The case is illustrative of the potential of the process for challenging racial discrimination and racist violence directed against refugees. The problems faced by those who are not recognised as refugees and also not returned for humanitarian reasons is illustrated in A.M.M. v Switzerland. 113 The petitioner applied for asylum in Switzerland (fearing persecution on return to Somalia) and was not granted refugee status, but was also not returned for humanitarian reasons due to the country situation in Somalia at the time. The plight of the petitioner in Switzerland is illustrative of the problems faced by those who are not granted refugee status (he held an "F" permit that signalled his temporary admission status). The complaint was that the treatment experienced was a result of the petitioner's ethnic origin or Somali nationality and violated the Convention. The State party argued, however, that the issues raised related to his status under the law (on temporary admission) that applied in Switzerland to all foreign nationals. The Committee's view was that the petitioner had not "unequivocally established" that the discriminatory treatment was the result of his ethnic origin or nationality and therefore there was no violation of Article 1.
114
Nevertheless, the Committee still commented on the position of those with temporary admission status in Switzerland, drew the attention of the State party to its General
Conclusion
The potential normative reach of international human rights law is impressive, and its growth in a relatively short historical period is remarkable. All those displaced are in principle included within its embrace; status and location are not primary concerns. This does not mean that states are prepared to welcome a new and expanded approach to the international definition of "refugee" or are now more open to accepting a guaranteed right to be granted asylum. The instrumental imperatives of migration management continue to shape national, regional and international responses. It also does not prohibit states from regulating migration or from making distinctions in national law and practice that respect the boundaries established by international human rights law.
Human rights law informs refugee law to such an extent (in definitional and substantive terms) that the relevance of the latter is questioned. 117 It shifts the focus towards human rights violations and abuses, including those that cause displacement. The evolution of the principle of non-refoulement stands out as a striking contribution. It is able to evolve at such a pace at the international and regional levels, precisely because mechanisms of monitoring, supervision and enforcement exist and are tied to the relevant rights. Refugee law, with its essentially devolved system of implementation, can achieve this too through developments at the national level, comparative experience, international interventions and the work of UNHCR. There is a tension that will remain. The interpretative gains achieved through adjudicative mechanisms, and the interventions of the international human rights regime, can be contested by states. Over the longer term the question of explicit reform of international refugee law should not be neglected. Rather than invite the emergence of piecemeal and variable forms of status might there be scope for international refugee law to draw relevant international human rights trends expressly into its domain? Is it time to accept the implications of the advance of human rights and open up the concept of refugee once again so that it reflects the reality of displacement more fully, with all the associated implications for UNHCR and other institutions? Or is the better option to continue to encourage support for the Refugee Convention (properly understood), embed the current definitional framework further (informed by human rights norms) and seek equal treatment for the other complementary or subsidiary forms of protection that emerge?
